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Training agencies as intermediary organizations in apprentice training 
in Norway and Switzerland: General purpose or niche production 
tools? 
In recent years Norway and Switzerland have introduced local training agencies 
(TAs), local intermediary organizations consisting of firms involved in apprentice 
training. In both countries, the starting point for the formation of the TA was 
roughly similar: enabling more firms to participate in apprentice training. Despite 
similar tasks, TAs have developed differently in the two countries. In Norway 
TAs have evolved as general- purpose tools in the governance of apprentice 
training while in Switzerland they are restricted to small niches. The article 
investigates these different outcomes using theories of intermediary organizations 
in the governance of collective skill formation systems at the local level.
Keywords: Governance, local training agencies, intermediary organizations, 
collective skill formation, apprenticeship
1. Introduction
The search for new policy instruments and institutions in vocational education and 
training (VET) has been a constant feature in most European countries since the 
millennium (Culpepper 2003). As most national educational systems have reached a 
stage where the whole cohort of youth is expected to enrol in upper secondary 
education, there is a new awareness of apprenticeship and the virtues of the firm as a 
place of learning. However, the Achilles heel of apprentice training has traditionally 
been the lack of enough high-quality training places. Providing more and better 
apprenticeships has been claimed a priority in the European social partners' 2015-2017 
joint work programme (BUSINESSEUROPE et al. 2015). We focus on new 
intermediary organizations and networks in VET at the local level. Norway and 
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Switzerland have recently introduced training agencies (TAs), local intermediary 
organizations consisting of firms involved in apprentice training. In both countries, the 
starting point for the formation of the TA was roughly similar: building new 
organizational structures and networks that enabled more firms to participate in 
apprentice training (Michelsen and Høst 2004, Walther and Renold 2005). However, 
TAs have developed differently in the two countries. In Switzerland, TAs seem to 
appeal to small niches of firms engaged in apprentice training. Approximately three 
percent of apprenticeship contracts are concluded with a TA. In Norway, by contrast, 
hiring apprentices through a training agency comprise around 80 percent of young 
people's apprentice training contracts. They seem to function as general-purpose tools 
for local inter-firm collaboration in apprentice training, suitable for all kinds of firms 
and applications. This contrast raises an interesting research question: How can the 
difference in outcomes be explained? 
2. Theoretical perspectives: Training agencies as intermediary 
organizations in collective skill formation systems
Relevant streams of research for cross-national comparisons of TAs can be identified in 
the literature on apprentice training, theories of neo-corporatism (Streeck 1987, 1992) 
and in the comparative literature on collective skill formation systems (Busemeyer and 
Trampusch 2012a). In this section we aim to bring central elements from these 
literatures together to illuminate the role of TAs in the governance of apprentice training 
at the local level.
In collective skill formation systems firms, intermediate associations and the state 
cooperate in the formation of portable, standardized skill profiles acquired through a 
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combination of school and firm-based training (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012a). The 
workings of this type of systems depends on deliberate public policies, shared logics of 
action and strong norms of cooperation between firms (Thelen 2014). In the skill 
formation literature, most attention has been focused on national systems and the role of 
employer organizations, their relations to unions and their involvement in the 
administration and reform of skill formation systems (Martin and Swank 2012, 
Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012b). However, national VET systems display 
considerable heterogeneity between different sectors and branches of working life. At 
the local level, national systems are moulded with local traditions and translated into a 
variety of practices which often deviate considerably from national norms and legal 
prescriptions (Culpepper 2003). These constellations of actors and structures might 
produce very different habitats for skill formation. Emmenegger, Graf and Trampusch. 
(2019) argue that there is a need to supplement comparative cross-national studies of 
national systems with studies on the actual workings of skill formation systems on the 
local level in the governance of VET. In this paper we intend to contribute to that 
research agenda. 
The emergence and workings of new networks or network-like organizations in the 
production of training as a collective good represent a promising focus for the study of 
VET governance at the local level which has not received much attention. In the VET 
literature, such organizations go under many labels, ranging from inter-firm 
collaborations, training networks, training circles, learning alliances, training offices, 
local training agencies, small scale employer cooperation in training, or training 
consortiums (Schmierl 2010, Bluhm 1999, Michelsen and Høst 2004, Leemann and 
Imdorf 2015). The labels illustrate that these organizations can take on a variety of 
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forms and functions. We prefer to use the term training agencies (TAs), which 
emphasizes that these organizations can be fruitfully analysed as actors in self-
organizing local governance networks, characterized by local cooperation, 
interdependence, resource exchange and rules of the game (Rhodes, 1995).
2.1 Logics of membership and influence
To get a grip on the role of the TAs in the local governance of VET we can turn to 
contributions from the (neo-)corporatist literature and intermediary organizations 
(Streeck 1987, Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Intermediary organizations are 
organizations that have other organizations as members (Streeck 1987, 1992). On the 
one hand, TAs can be regarded as an expression of values, perceptions and interests that 
are dominant among a collective of member firms, often characterized as the logic of 
membership (Streeck 1987, 105), where the focus is on agency-membership dynamics 
and internal structures. TAs depend on and expect that member firms train and 
sometimes recruit apprentices in their respective trades and sectors, that they are willing 
to finance TA activities, and that the training will be carried out according to formal 
regulations in the trade. These expectations impose constraints, and membership 
depends on whether these collaborative arrangements are perceived as beneficial and 
appropriate or not. Over time TAs must be able to secure a stable exchange of resources 
with members, punish free-riders and reward loyal members. 
Intermediary organizations must also mediate between the members and the 
institutional task environment in which they are embedded. In this logic of influence 
(ibid), the agency must communicate member interests towards external stakeholders in 
an adequate way, secure legitimacy, and honour obligations and expectations. This also 
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implies the forging of compromises and practical solutions to coordination problems 
over time. Intermediary organizations must come up with two achievements at the same 
time in order to achieve leverage for agency and autonomy (Streeck 1987). This can be 
difficult to accomplish, as demands may be conflicting, contradictory or even 
incompatible (Streeck 1987, 1992). Accordingly, TAs with little or no autonomy in its 
relation to member firms will find it hard to develop long-term training strategies and 
fruitful engagement with public authorities and actors. On the other hand, through 
prolonged and systematic interaction with regulatory agencies and/or para-state 
institutions, TAs might obtain access to resources, financing and legitimacy in return for 
paying heed to and adhering to their policy agendas. However, if they develop too far in 
this direction, they might lose the loyalty of their members, which might defect or avoid 
membership. 
The formation and evolution of TAs as intermediary organizations might also have 
additional implications, in so far as they intervene in established actor configurations 
between training firms and employer associations as well as in the division of labour 
between various public or para-state authorities and the employers/unions in the 
governance of VET. Variation in local government structures and local governance 
networks and habitats might shape intermediary organizations like TAs in different 
directions. Local political and/or administrative decision makers might try to exploit TAs 
for a number of purposes, ranging from efficient implementation of local VET schemes for 
capacity building to affirmative action schemes in apprentice training. TAs may also be able 
to act as catalysts for the transformation of firm perceptions, preferences and practices 
or adhere to older values and practices. The character and strength of these pressures 
may in turn affect member inclusiveness and agency strategies in various ways. These 
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prospects make local TAs an interesting object for the empirical study of reform in the 
governance of collective skill formation systems.
3.  TAs and varieties of collective skill formation
Collective skill formation systems have a number of commonalities, but they also vary 
significantly. Switzerland is often considered as one of the primary examples of a 
continental type of collective skill formation system (Busemeyer and Trampusch 
2012b), characterized by vocational training in firm-specific and industry-specific skills 
as well as the separation between welfare arrangements/social policies and education 
(Busemeyer 2014). With a share of 90%, apprenticeship training is by far the most 
prevalent form of VET, and is mostly organised as one-company-based VET. Around 
two third of all young people who complete compulsory education enrol within 2 years 
in VET (65’000 apprentices in their first year of VET).  Dual-track VET programmes 
are by far the most prevalent form of vocational education and training. This proportion 
has remained constant for years. (SERI 2018).
 Norwegian VET has traditionally been classified as a social democratic skill formation 
system, where the comprehensively organized educational system is recognized as an 
integral part of the universalist welfare state, where . Tthe state is active and strongly 
involved in policies for inclusion in education (Michelsen and Stenstrøm 2018). The 
Norwegian model follows a sequential logic based on a combination of two years of 
school-based VET followed by two years of apprentice training in the firm.  Qualified 
applicants compete for apprenticeships among 20.000 registered training firms, and 
approximately one third of a youth cohort enters apprenticeship, the majority before 
they are 20 years of age.  About 50% of all youth enrol in VET tracks after completion 
of compulsory education. This has been stable for years, but the apprenticeship system 
has been incrementally growing since the 1970s.   Both systems are normally 
considered as consensus-oriented and corporatist, permeated by bargaining and open 
styles of policy-making, where the major producer groups and political actors are 
embedded in dense corporatist arrangements (Katzenstein 1984, Lijphart 1999). 
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However, the character of these corporatist structures varies. Switzerland is often 
regarded as an expression of the liberal form of corporatism (Bonoli and Wilson 2019). 
Norway, on the other hand, belongs to the family of social democratic corporatism. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that these types of states are distinct, and they have 
developed different types of policies and educational structures. Core elements of the 
difference between the two systems can be captured though the distinction between 
state-led and firm-sponsored collectivist VET systems (Thelen 2014), where the 
distribution of power and capacities between the state and the firms in the governance 
of VET is differently shaped.  We argue that a these two different systems provide 
interesting contexts for the study of intermediary organizations like TAs in VET.  We 
We assume that the interaction of the logics of influence and the logic of membership 
in the shaping of TA task profiles  iTAs will be affected by these different habitats, 
structures, governance arrangements and practices in the different collective skill 
formation systems in which they are embedded, providing different constellations of 
ressources and constraints for the  development of the TAs.
Furthermore, both countries are small, open and decentralized states (Katzenstein 1984). 
Switzerland is a federal state divided into 26 cantons where each canton enjoys relative 
autonomy in the field of education. Norway is a decentralized unitary state, divided into 
19 general purpose county municipalities, which develop their own policies and 
practices within the confines of broad national regulations. Thus, persistent local 
variation in conditions for TA formation and TA practices can be expected in both 
countries. 
4. Measuring profiles of training agencies 
Enabling more firms to participate in the production of standardized portable skills 
through the apprentice system has been the main consideration leading to the formation 
of TAs in both countries. The big question is how TAs as intermediary organizations 
engage in the governance of VET. To map the cooperation and division of labour 
between the member firms and the TA, and between the TA and external actors, we 
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propose four different core tasks upon which TA profiles can be investigated. We ask 
four core questions, which we elaborate on in the following section:  
4.1 Who trains?
Apprenticeship usually denotes an attachment of apprentices to an employer for a 
specific number of years, where they engage in work-based training (Ryan 2012). Often 
this relation is formalized contractually though a work contract and/or a training 
contract signed between the training firm and the apprentice. The training in the firm is 
enabled and constrained by firm layout and production structures. Membership in a TA 
allows the production of broader as well as more versatile skill profiles that transcend 
the training capacity of the individual member firm. This requires that the apprentice is 
temporarily relocated to other member firms for additional training or to other training 
venues through coordinated rotation schemes organized by the TA. However, 
collaborative inter-firm rotation schemes within the TA challenges the “classical” one-
to-one contract between the apprentice and the training firm and expose the individual 
training firm to poaching strategies from other member firms. Furthermore, such 
arrangements also require coordination from the agency as well as formal contractual 
solutions to issues of accountability, financing and employment. Such considerations 
open for transferring the legal responsibility for the training from the training firms to 
the TA. On that basis, we assume that variations in the provision of training will affect 
relations between the training firms, the TA and the public authorities. 
4.2  Who pays?
The significance of financing is a well-established feature in the literature on VET 
systems (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012b). We assume that the level and structure of 
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financing have implications for the position of the TA in relation to members and 
towards public authorities. High levels of firm funding will mean a high threshold for 
membership, and high level of financial dependency of the TA in relation to member 
firms. High levels of public subsidies will create a lower threshold for firms to join a 
TA and reduce the financial dependency of the TA towards the member firm. 
Accordingly, high levels of state subsidies allocated to TA formation and maintenance 
will probably create conditions for high levels of dependency to the state, while low 
levels of state funding will probably strengthen the position of the TA’s in relation to 
public authorities. Changes in the level of funding and funding arrangements might also 
create conditions for the position of TAs over time. In some types of systems, state 
subsidies are not generally accepted and perceived as fundamentally impairing the 
autonomy of the firm (Thelen 2004). Under such conditions, the state will not have 
strong financial instruments at its disposal in order to affect changes in firm-based 
apprentice training. In the start-up phase TAs can rely on short-term incentives and 
schemes from local government, but over time additional resources must be acquired 
from other sources.
4.3 Who monitors?
Traditionally, monitoring implies that the individual training firm must obtain VET 
accreditation from relevant (public) authorities, agencies or associations. This implies 
the formalization of the right of regulatory agencies to extract information from training 
providers on the quality of the training, and the duty of the training providers to supply 
adequate information. The extent of monitoring depends on the character and the degree 
of detail in the regulations. But of equal importance is how these regulations are 
interpreted and practiced, and by whom (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012b). In 
decentralized collective skill formation systems, strong forms of formal standardization 
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in tandem with a high degree of detailed monitoring can be intimately related to flexible 
enforcement, providing room for local adjustments and adaptation (Gonon and Maurer 
2012; Emmenegger, Graf and Trampusch 2019). We assume that intermediary 
organizations like TAs can provide potential solutions to the problem of monitoring at 
the local level, securing flexibility and adaptability as well as local coordination and 
collaboration, but in different ways and formats. 
4.4 Who recruits?
In collective skill formation systems, the recruitment of apprentices has traditionally 
been organized according to the preferences and timing of the individual training firm. 
The general view emphasizes the tight coupling between the training firm and the 
apprentice, where the firm recruit apprentices as a source of (future) labour. However, 
policies for the inclusion of specific target groups in apprentice training or perceptions 
of upper secondary education as education for all have challenged this view. Here we 
want to close in focus on the role the TAs would take in the division of labour between 
the TA and member firms in the identification and selection of applicants. We assume 
that TAs are expected to play an intermediary role in the recruitment of apprentices as 
well as in the implementation of apprentice inclusion policies, but also that we will find 
variations and tensions in TA/member firm recruitment norms and practices. 
5. Cases, data and applications
We have charted the evolution of the Norwegian and Swiss TAs, their organizational 
forms and formal structures, the tasks they perform and their relations to member firms 
and external stakeholders (county municipalities/cantons, professional, para-state and 
employer organizations) in the period 1990-2015. Information on the provision of 
training, funding arrangements, monitoring and recruitment practices have been 
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obtained from various public sources and through material collected in empirical studies 
of training agencies and their functioning in the two countries. In addition to these 
sources, we rely on two national surveys of the entire population of training agencies 
and their affiliated companies in Norway in 1997 and 2014 (Michelsen, Høst and 
Gitlesen 1998, Høst et al. 2014), and an evaluation (questionnaire) which comprises all 
TAs and their affiliated companies in 2008 by the Swiss federal government (BBT 
2008). We have collected a broad set of interview data from a selection of TAs and their 
member firms, from Norway (1997 and 2014) and Switzerland (2014). We have also 
interviewed representatives from the national VET council, the national educational 
authorities, regional VET-councils and county councils in Norway as well as 
representatives from the federal government of VET, the conference of cantonal 
ministers of VET, and of pioneers of initiating TAs in Switzerland. The data have 
enabled us to compare the TAs in Norway and Switzerland in terms of organization of 
relations between the training firms, the TA and external stakeholders along the four 
above-mentioned dimensions. 
However, available data on local cooperation and governance practices and the 
workings of TAs in the two countries are not symmetrical. Unfortunately, there is not 
much systematic research available in Switzerland on the actual practices of cooperation 
at the local level in the governance of VET between cantonal vocational training 
offices, training organisations (mainly training companies) and intermediary 
organisations (professional associations, training agencies) (Emmenegger, Graf and 
Trampusch 2019).  
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6. Trajectories, task profiles and logics of membership and influence 
This section presents TA task profiles and trajectories in the two countries. Table 1 
provides an overview of the main results, which in turn are fleshed out in the two 




The launch of the TAs in Norway is strongly related to the pathbreaking 1994 reform, 
where the apprenticeship system was formally integrated into a comprehensive system 
for upper secondary education. All 16-19-year olds were given a statutory right to three 
years of education, either general or vocational. The new system required new 
regulations as well as a strong and consistent rise in the number of apprenticeships. To 
facilitate expansion, one of the most important measures was the formation of local 
TAs. The idea was that firms affiliated with such an agency would be able to offer high 
quality apprentice training programs if supported by TA coordination and monitoring, 
inter-firm rotation schemes and more generous financing arrangements. Within few 
years, this policy triggered a transformation of the Norwegian TA scheme into a general 
frame for organizing apprenticeship training. In 2014, the TAs had increased their share 
of the training contracts to a staggering 80 percent (Høst, Skålholt, Reiling and 
Gjerulstad, 2014), and the number of TAs presently exceed 300.  
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6.1.2 Task profiles
TAs have a potential for involving enterprises which are too small or too specialized to 
offer the full range of apprenticeship training through rotation schemes. However, 
available data does not provide much support for the significance of rotation schemes, 
with some notable exceptions, e.g. in the public health sector, where regulations 
explicitly require rotation between different training sites. As a rule, the individual 
member firm is formally recognized as a training firm on its own, performs the training 
of the apprentice on its own, and there is consequently no need for inter-firm rotation 
and coordination of training trajectories.  
As far as financing is concerned, apprentice wages are paid by the training firm. But the 
growing need for more apprentices has been reflected in the structure and level of state 
funding. State subsidies have increased considerably after the reform, and subsidies to 
TA members are allocated directly to the TAs on a yearly basis. Normally state funding 
exceeds TA operating costs by a considerable margin. On average, fifty percent of the 
funding is redistributed to the member firms by the TA governing boards, which consist 
of representatives from the firms (Høst, Skålholt, Reiling and Gjerustad, 2014). In effect 
state funding is shared between the TA and the members and considered as just 
compensation for their joint training efforts.
New state and local regulations in the form of quality assessment systems have opened 
up for the intensification and broadening of monitoring in firm-based as well as school-
based training. The TAs have moved in and taken over the formal responsibility for 
documentation and monitoring of training from each member firm. This transformation 
has been facilitated by technological change in the form of digitalized systems for 
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quality assessment, where documented training forms the basis for site visits and 
follow-up on training progress for the individual apprentice from TA personnel. 
Norwegian TA members do not delegate recruitment of apprentices to the TAs and they 
normally recruit apprentices based on a combination of publicly organized transition 
processes and individual applications.  Lists of interested and qualified absolvents from 
local VET schools are each year prepared by local authorities and made available to the 
TAs in relevant trades and candidates distributed to member firms.  Tas as well as 
individual training firms also welcome applications for training places on an individual 
basis. This represent an alternative channel to the public transition process and is 
normally used by older applicants or by applicants interested in a particular training 
firm.  and individual applications (Høst, Skålholt, Reiling and Gjerustad, 2014). 
The selection of apprentices, in particular in the small enterprises, which dominate 
among training firms, is mainly based on traditional working life criteria, like ability to 
be on time, low absence and motivation to learn. Ability to fit into the firm as a social 
organization is often seen as more important than school performance and grades, and 
many firms have continued the old tradition of recruiting apprentices based on family- 
and social networks rather than formal school criteria. TAs do not actively intervene in 
the selection of individual apprentices. But they do put pressure on member firms to 
recruit apprentices. They screen and distribute information on applicants, they negotiate 
the number of training places available, and they conduct marketingbranding 
arrangements and assist members where they can. They may also lobby local authorities 
for extra public funding in return for accepting “weak learners”.
6.1.3 Interaction of logics of membership and influence
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Three different types of TA models can be identified in the 19 counties, depending on 
the policies of the county municipalities and the strength and performance of the TAs 
(Michelsen and Høst 2004). The artisan model of training, where the scope of the 
agency exclusively comprises one trade, conforms to the classical mode of craft 
organization. The branch model represents a more comprehensive form of organization 
and comprises a broader specter of related trades. The strategy of the branch or branch 
family model is the most common. It is dominant in the industrial trades and in the 
service sector  (machine tools, engineering, office work and IT) and is closely related to 
the different branches of industry and the service sector, allowing for  opening up for 
the formation of vertical relations between branch level associations at the national level 
and organized local training interests. The most inclusive model is the multi-trade 
model, where training can be provided in any mix of trades. The multi-trade model is 
primarily found in rural areas or in areas with low regional concentration of firms, while 
the artisan model is prevalent in large urban areas and towns. More than 80% of all TAs 
are members of networks of TAs, organized by national branch and/or regional 
affiliation.  The TAs have adapted to various combinations of local government, trade and 
branch specific conditions in the construction of their domains. TA domains are not 
protected by any sort of local monopoly, but competition between local TAs is not 
widespread. 
Relations between TAs and county municipalities variesy. The county municipalities are 
required by law to build adequate local quality assessment systems adjusted to local 
conditions. Reporting requirements and practices varies somewhat between county 
municipalities (Michelsen and Høst 2015). TAs involvement in overseeing and 
monitoring apprentice learning processes in all member firms has allowed a regrouping of 
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governance arrangements and practices, where most county municipalities have moved 
towards “steering at a distance” through auditing TA quality procedures rather than 
practicing site visits. Consequently, qualification structures in most VET county 
administrations have been transformed towards more general bureaucratic orientations. 
This means that actual training practices among TA member firms are primarily monitored 
by TA staff rather than public officials. In some regions, different configurations of actors 
and structures sustain more traditional monitoring arrangements based on official site 
visits. Despite new and intensified formal accountability regulations, there is not much to 
suggest that “real” public monitoring practices have been developed to the full extent of 
the law. Public authorities regularly include do not bypass the TAs in monitoring 
training quality processes in member firms, and lack of full reporting is as a rule not 
punished.
Another central task for collaboration between local authorities and TAs is recruitment 
processes. The county authorities and the TAs collaborate tightly on marketing branding 
arrangements and recruitment campaigns. Furthermore, the systematic use of TAs 
facilitates publicly organized transition processes and saves time and resources for local 
government. Furthermore, the systematic use of TAs facilitates publicly organized 
transition processes and saves time for monitoring progress and the need for providing 
following-up resources in the local educational administration is reduced
. Highly qualified applicants are often scarce, and cooperation with local educational 
offices can provide TA members with advantages of first access compared to non-
organized firms. A growing uptake of applicants to apprenticeships is a high-profile 
political goal in most counties, and TAs are strongly encouraged to take in additional, 
often weaker applicants. TA cCompliance and cooperation with local authorities in 
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recruitment processes according to set policy targets represent possibilities for TA 
influence and goodwill, while refusals to take in additional or weaker applicants might 
incur future costs and loss of local support. In some county municipalities TA 
recruitment performance is evaluated against the backdrop of the future calibration of 
local VET program capacity. This connection provides the authorities with potential 
leverage in negotiations with local TAs. In turn, the TAs can use similar arguments in 
their mediations with member firms to sustain a consistent supply of apprenticeship 
positions. The TAs also play an important role in the handling of formal grievances. 
The TAs often exert pressure on the member firm to try to find other solutions than the 
prospect of terminating the apprentice contract. If not, the TA will have to find another 
member firm willing to take over the apprentice. 
The TAs provide new links between local government and the firm in apprentice 
training. Relations to local authorities ar  not hierarchical but characterized by mutual 
dependency and cooperation and subjected to negotiations, compromise and rules of the 
game. Different local, branch, and sector conditions have contributed to the production 
of complex structures of TAs with various domains and varying TA-local governance 
structures and monitoring processes. The individual TA is small and local in character 
and governed by a board of employers/managers consisting of and elected by the 
general assembly of member firms.  TA capacity in general is quite limited, and task 
profiles seem to be relatively similar regardless of member domains. For the average 
TA, the net total of available human resources does not include more than three 
personman-years, most of them on full time, even though small differences in capacity 
can be observed.  The number of apprentices affiliated to each TA has been 
incrementally growing and now the average comprises 120 apprentices per TA.
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How can we explain why the Norwegian TA model have been generalized and 
stabilized?  In formal terms Norwegian TAs look like weak institutions. TAs do not 
intervene in training or recruitment prerogatives of the individual member firm but have 
much focus on recruitment and the monitoring of training. State subsidies are in practice 
split between the TAs and member firms, and the conflict level between TAs and 
member firms is low. Heavy state funding and strong local government involvement 
expose TAs to external performance demands and pressures. But these pressures also 
provide the TAs with important resources and influence in relation to local government, 
which depend on their coop ration. There is much to suggest that strong state/county 
municipal intervention have strengthened the position of the TA in relation to members 
rather than weakened it, and member firms seem to benefit from the ability of the 
agency to buffer external demands and negotiate solutions to problems in the local 
governance of apprentice training.
6.2. Switzerland
6.2.1 Trajectories
In the 1990s, triggered by an economic recession as well as structural transformations, 
the number of apprenticeships on offer was substantially reduced. In view of the large 
number of school leavers unable to find an apprenticeship position, representatives of 
dual VET came under increasing political and medial pressure as the willingness and 
capabilities of firms to participate was increasingly questioned (Leemann 2019). In 
1997, the Federal Parliament decided to launch an offensive (parliamentary resolution) 
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to improve the supply of apprenticeships in response to this shortage of training places. 
Supportive measures were created in the form of , where start-up financing and 
information for the creation of training networks was proposed and accepted 
(Bundesbeschluss 1997). 
The core idea was to create new apprenticeship positions by involving enterprises which 
were too small or too specialised to offer the full range of apprenticeship training 
(Knobel 2000; Walther and Renold 2005). Training networks would allow firms to train 
apprentices through inter-firm rotation schemes (Leemann and Imdorf 2015a). TAs 
were made responsible for running a training network, which means acquiring enough 
host companies, recruiting apprentices, organizing a rotation plan, supervising the 
apprentices, supporting the companies in their training tasks and guarantying quality 
assurance of apprenticeship training as well as handling grievances and problems with 
apprentices.  TAs represented problem-solving opportunities in all these areas which 
now could be acquired – at an additional cost. TAs were constructed in several legal 
formats, as an association, foundation or limited company (BBT 2008).
6.2.2 Task profiles
The Swiss training-network-TA model comprises several distinct features that differ 
strongly from the traditional one-company model of apprenticeship format. Firstly, the 
apprenticeship contract is concluded between the TA and the apprentice, as the TA 
possesses the relevant VET accreditation. One consequence is that apprentices have two 
trainers: a training manager at the TA and a VET instructor in each company that takes 
part in the rotation scheme (shared guidance). Besides, companies must transfer 
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discretion as well as responsibility to partner companies involved in the rotation 
scheme. 
Secondly, responsibility for recruitment and selection of apprentices are also allocated 
to the TA. Consequently, the member firms lose their influence on the selection of 
apprentices and cannot bring their selection criteria and traditional ways of recruiting 
(e.g. by social/family bounds, by PR-policies) into play. As a result, companies in 
training networks lose the exclusive right to recruit, train and socialise youngsters based 
on their organizational specific criteria and requirements (Leemann et al. 2016). In 
principle rotation schemes have a potential for improving conditions for more versatile 
quality training, which in turn may strengthen the position of the apprentice in the 
labour market. Most TA apprentices regard the flexibility required by the rotation 
scheme, getting to know different companies, the resulting broad professional training 
and the many new contacts as an opportunity rather than a burden. But on the other 
hand, Moreover, the rotation scheme and the shortened training period of 6-12 months 
in each company reduces the productivity of the apprentices and increases time and 
effort spent in supervision, as apprentices have to be re-introduced to the tasks and 
norms of the company every year anew (Leemann et al. 2016). Furthermore, the 
implementation of the rotation system creates a variety of distributional problems. 
Competition among companies for trained apprentices is more obvious and more real, 
as participating companies are pitted against one another in the competition for the best 
apprenticeship graduates (Leemann and Imdorf 2015a, 2015b). 
Thirdly, TAs function as mediators between the companies, apprentices and the 
cantonal authority in the monitoring and quality assurance of training. TAs invest in 
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monitoring and quality management through an official site visit at the time of 
application of a firm, through regular visits of the apprentice at the half-yearly 
assessment interview, through additional contact per Email, telephone, and meetings at 
the TA and through surveys among apprentices and companies. “This gives it a kind of 
control function over the training companies”1. However, lack of data present problems 
for interpretation and further research on these questions of local VET governance is 
needed. In general, TA training has a potential for superior training quality (Leemann 
and Birr 2015). Moreover, TA’s monitoring is enhanced compared to that of micro-
enterprises, which due to resource poverty, are exposed to strong tensions between 
production and training (Baumeler and Lamamra 2018). Micro firms often recruit 
apprentices with lower school achievements and therefore are important for youth 
integration into the labour market. In consequence, “state authorities might not insist 
that micro firms comply in every respect with the law” when formal workplace trainer 
qualifications or working hour regulations are not adhered to  (Baumeler and Lamamra 
2018, 16). TA’s monitoring might therefore encounter resistance from (micro) 
companies.
Finally, the participating companies pay for the services provided by the TA, for 
running costs as well as apprentice wages. On average, the financial contribution of the 
company amounts to approximately double of the salary for the apprentice (BBT 2008). 
Available state subsidies are limited and temporary in character. Since 1997, TAs can 
request start-up financing for the first few years of running a training network. Later, 
they have to be self-financed. Many of them are forced to raise additional funding either 
1 SDBB_2012_Merkblatt 20 Lehrbetriebsverbünde (http://www.berufsbildung.ch/dyn/bin/3819-
13828-1-mb20.pdf). Own translation.
Page 21 of 31
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjve





























































For Peer Review Only
from the canton by being commissioned to provide additional apprenticeship places 
(e.g. for selected professions, for socially disadvantaged youth) as part of the 
apprenticeship marketing programme or by community donations. This is difficult and 
time consuming in most cases (Leemann 2019).
6.2.3 Interaction of logics of membership and influence
More than twenty different occupations (professional trainings) are offered in TA 
networks.  Around half of the TA networks train apprentices in a single occupation.
TA membership vary from two training companies up to TA with 100 members and 
more. The average TA network consists of eight training companies. However, some 
common features can be identified based on available data.  Control over and 
responsibility for recruitment, training and monitoring places the TAs in a strong formal 
position in relation to member firms. However, this position is eroded and undermined 
through a variety of practices, where member companies negotiate company-specific 
demands and expectations in the recruitment, supervision and training of apprentices 
(Leemann and Imdorf 2015b; Leemann et al. 2016). This has led to tensions and 
conflicts between the TAs and member firms. TAs must take these pressures into 
account, in order to avoid exit solutions. In turn, these adaptations produce new strains, 
fuelling new demands and tensions between members (Leemann and Imdorf 2015a). 
Some companies make participation in the network more or less explicitly conditional 
upon receiving apprentices that have reached an advanced stage of their training 
trajectory, while others insist on receiving “Swiss” rather than “foreign” apprentices .
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Furthermore, internal strains have been accompanied by loss of external legitimacy and 
support. Initially, the Confederation defined a separate subsidy area for the promotion 
of training networks. The Swiss Conference of VET Offices committed to the new 
training model and produced a Training Agency Handbook "at a remarkable pace" 
(Gertsch 1999, p. 3). Many cantons included the model in their plans and committed 
individual actors in the cantons repeatedly tried to support the establishment of training 
networks by networking interested actors. The aim was to set up a separate professional 
organization for training networks in order to maintain sufficient influence and 
assertiveness in the collective governance by the three partners – the Confederation, the 
cantons and professional organisations. However, it was not possible to consolidate a 
common basis of interest and to recruit enough members. Soon it became apparent that 
the establishment of training networks was lagging. In 20172 only approximately three 
percent of apprenticeship contracts are concluded in a training network with a TA. 
How can we explain why the Swiss model have not spread substantially despite efforts 
towards stabilization and generalisation? In formal terms Swiss TAs possess substantial 
decision-making powers in relation to members (logic of membership). Nevertheless, to 
run a successful training network, TAs must respect and consider the expectations and 
interests of their member firms regarding recruiting, training and financing, and they 
must not act too much as control instances in monitoring quality of training. This is 
crucial for preventing defection of companies. As we have mentioned above, TAs are 
constantly concerned with managing the strains resulting from the diverse features of 
the model, where practices tend to undermine their strong formal position. Moreover, 
they must invest a lot of time and financial resources for the recruitment of a pool of 
2 Personal information from the Federal Statistical Office.
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training companies as members of the TA (BBT 2008, p.11). On the other hand, 
training networks and their respective TAs depend on  supportlegitimacy from public 
authorities and from professional organizations (logic of influence). This was the case in 
the initial phase at the end of the 1990s. Later, when the apprenticeship market eased, 
the Confederation has been reluctant to intervene in the policy of the cantons and left to 
the professional associations and companies to decide whether training networks should 
be developed within their branches, and the TA model disappeared from the political 
agenda. Furthermore, it became apparent, that the model was causing difficulties in 
implementation (Gertsch 1999). Hhigh costs have made make TAs vulnerable to 
resource problems and attrition. Companies must pay a flat-rate contribution to the TA. 
About one half covers the wage of the apprentices, the rest covers TA services. The 
visible registered costs of training apprentices are thus about twice as high for TA 
members compared to companies not affiliated to a TA. Financial support for TAs by 
cantonal authorities is often related to start-up periods or comes with the obligation of 
integrating school leavers who encounter problems in getting an apprenticeship place 
(Imdorf and Leemann 2012). 
As a result, the TA model based on training networks has evolved into a niche. Today, 
we can find two types of such niches that have been established during the last twenty 
years (Leemann et al. 2016). One type is characterised by its features of social inclusion 
(Imdorf and Leemann 2012). These training networks are initiated predominantly top 
down by (para-)state actors in the context of cantonal apprenticeship marketing. They 
pursue the aims of creating new apprenticeship places for school leavers who did not 
find an apprenticeship directly after compulsory school and of installing more 
universalistic recruitment processes. The other type is distinguished by its focus on 
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capacity building and improving quality of training. These initiatives evolved as bottom 
up processes from the professional organizations or companies due to skills shortage, 
specialisation of companies, and special skill requirements (BBT 2008, p. 9). 
7. Discussion
Now we can return to our research question.; TAs were introduced in both countries as 
instruments to “solve” the shortage of apprenticeship places in the 1990s. Hhow can 
differences in outcomes can be explained?. We have conceptualized TAs as 
intermediary organizations in the governance of VET. We have suggested four different 
types of core tasks we can analyse while studying training agencies in terms of the 
interaction between the logic of membership and the logic of influence. As intermediary 
organizations, the TAs in both countries perform similar tasks, but they do it in very 
different ways. A systematic comparison of TA’s task profiles indicate that they have 
evolved into solutions to different problems. As such, their respective profiles have 
been formed by the institutional environment, which they were assumed to impact. 
In Norway, TAs have evolved into flexible, general purpose tools, where a highly 
heterogeneous membership of training firms in different geographical settings, different 
sizes, different sectors (public or private) and different branches of working life  seems 
able to benefit from their services. 80 percent of all apprenticeships are solicited by TA 
member firms. Joining a TA is comparatively cheap, and the state provides heavy 
subsidies. Members are recognized as authorized training firms on their own, the 
selection of apprentices is firmly in the hands of the individual member firm, and inter-
firm rotation practices are not widespread. In Switzerland, training networks run by TAs 
seem to have found more marginal space in two small niches. Only three percent of the 
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total number of apprenticeships contracts are concluded with a TA. The Swiss TAs are 
formally responsible for recruitment and coordination of rotation schemes. In practice, 
the strong formal position of the TAs in recruitment and rotation tasks seems to create 
tensions in TA relations to member firms. Compared to Norway, membership costs are 
considerably higher due to the combination of limited and short-term public subsidies 
and resource-intensive professionalised support offered to member companies during 
the training. The net result has been low interest among training firms and loss of 
legitimacy.
In Norway TAs have quite unexpectedly grown into new and important structural 
components in the governance of the VET system, capable of adjusting to local 
government pressures and local branch/sector specific variations. Their performance 
testifies to the strength of weak institutions. Norwegian TAs have low formal decision-
making powers in relation to member firms. They are furthermore totally dependent on 
public subsidies. Yet, local authorities are heavily dependent on the TAs for reaching 
policy targets on apprenticeship. This illustrates the mutual dependency relations 
between local government and the TAs. In monitoring and recruitment, the TAs serve as 
mediating organizations and as a buffer between local government on the one hand and 
member firms on the other. Despite the intensification and broadening of formal 
monitoring regulations, the extent of monitoring practices has remained relatively 
stable. 
While the Norwegian development illustrates its state-led character, the firm-led Swiss 
institutional configuration points towards a different direction. The autonomy of the 
apprenticeship system has traditionally been highly valued. It is the dominant form of 
Page 26 of 31
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rjve





























































For Peer Review Only
upper secondary VET supplemented by VET schools. The contrast to the Norwegian 
trajectory, where apprenticeship has a far more marginal position in terms of 
enrollment, is considerable. 
Much of the tensions in Swiss TAs have focused on the problems of inter-firm rotation 
as well as insider-outsider issues in the development of more inclusive practices in 
apprentice recruitment. The combination of TA’s formal control of recruitment and 
coordination of rotation practices have challenged old values and practices in the 
employer dominated Swiss system, as TA affiliated firms no longer fully control their 
own admission and training processes. Moving in this direction would imply a major 
transformation of the Swiss VET system, where the role of the firm in apprentice 
training is reconfigured. 
The findings find resonance in the neo-corporatist and governance approaches. In 
Norway, strong state commitment, high public subsidies, new quality-oriented 
monitoring regulations and steering at a distance practices have provided the TAs with 
considerable resources as well as tasks. They have gained a significant position in the 
space between the firm and public authorities in apprentice training. They have evolved 
into hubs in publicly organized transition processes as well as in monitoring of training 
quality. They do not intervene in firm prerogatives in recruitment but facilitate 
monitoring of quality and mediate between the training firm and the apprentice. The 
development of the TA has furthermore provided conditions for the effected a 
transforming ation of local governance structures and processes, where local 
government has regrouped and developed in the direction of “steering at a distance” 
rather than site visits in quality monitoring.
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The contrast to the Swiss situation is staggering. The Swiss TAs intervene more 
strongly in areas of member firm interests, but they are also more dependent on high 
member financial contributions than their Norwegian equivalents. The Swiss TAs seem 
less exposed to state and cantonal pressures than the Norwegian, and possibilities to 
extract resources in their dealings with local and state stakeholders seems more limited 
and less stable. urthermore, the individualized Swiss transition system does not allow 
TA-local authorities collaboration in the organization of recruitment to the same extent 
as the Norwegian.
As far as outcomes are concerned, Then there is the more long term issue whether the 
Swiss and the Norwegian  TAstraining networks can be seen as catalysts for 
modernization and a transition to a new regime more adjusted to the logic of universal 
educational systems, where firms involved in apprentice training are increasingly 
working together under local cooperative arrangements. In a certain sense TAs and the 
formation of training networks hold a promise of modernizing Swiss recruitment 
practices and and transcending older firm specific training practices.  But they work in 
different ways. Swiss TAs wield stronger formal decision-making powers but also seem 
more permeated by internal tensions compared to Norwegian TAs, and costs. costs are 
higher.  While Norwegian TAs have enjoyed a strong but unanticipated upturn, Iit has 
proved difficult to get Swiss firms on board TA projects. Although the formation of 
Swiss training networks run by TAs might represent an interesting effort to improve the 
quality of training and inclusion in small and  medium sized companiesmodernize the 
Swiss VET system, their growth potential seems small – so far. 
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Table 1: Summary of results
Countries
Question Norway: Switzerland:
Who trains?  The individual firm  Several firms together (rotation 
between member firms)
 Shared guidance of apprentices
Who pays?  High state subsidies
 Low firm costs
 Low state subsidies
 High firm costs
Who monitors?  Monitoring and quality 
management through public 
“steering at a distance” 
 Monitoring of individual 
apprentice rights and firm 
obligations for the training 
conducted by TA staff
 Individual apprentice rights and 
firm obligations for the training 
monitored by TA staff  
 TA responsible for the 
documentation of training 
quality to local authorities
 Annual public surveys of 
apprentices and trainers
 Monitoring and quality management 
through
 official site visit by 
representatives from the TA at 
the time of application of the 
firm
 regular visits of the apprentice at 
the company by the training 
manager of the TA 
 surveys of apprentices and 
companies
Who recruits?  The individual firm
 Training agency mediation, 
branding and screening
 Mixture of collectively 
organized and individualized 
transition system
 The training agency (branding, 
recruiting, selection)
 Individual member firms sometimes 
try to regain influence, where TA 
may comply with firm expectations
 Individualized transition system
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